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Failure To Inform As Medical Malpractice
I.

-

INTRODUCTION

This note concerns the physician's tort liability for failing to
disclose to the patient medical information about his case which the
patient should know in order to determine what shall be done with his
body. Each medical case requires the attending physician to assemble
a vast amount of technical information before he acts; namely, the
patient's history, the diagnosis, the general nature of the contemplated
procedure, the risks involved, the prospects of success, the prognosis if
the procedure is not performed, and the alternative methods of
treatment. Nevertheless, many people who have undergone surgery will
recall their own ignorance of both the technical nature of the operation
and the particular medical risks that threatened disability or death. The
physician has traditionally refused to disclose more than the most basic
information to his patient before treatment. After treatment, however,
the patient may discover that he has sustained a serious and permanent
injury resulting from treatment which entailed a high degree of risk.
Subsequently, the patient may possibly consult his attorney. If he sues
his physician, recovery is likely, for there is a growing line of cases
which award damages to patients for unavoidable injuries sustained
from medical treatment. These cases reason that the physician
wrongfully withheld information from the patient concerning the
proposed treatment.
Assuming that the physician is qualified to treat the patient and
has gathered the appropriate information, a total failure to inform the
patient about the contemplated procedure will have no bearing on the
physician's technical performance once the procedure is begun. If the
physician does not treat the patient properly and injury occurs, the
patient can recover under the general malpractice rules; consequently,
disclosure is not a problem. The legal wrong for failing to disclose
medical information is independent of improper treatment and usually
takes place before the physician treats the patient. Therefore, the cause
of action arises not from the physician's negligent performance but
from the procedure selected. The injury is simply a bad result which
can be foreseen but cannot be avoided by anyone in the medical
profession. Although a physician should not be held liable solely
because he was unsuccessful, there is an increasing tendency in this
country to allow recovery for unexpected bad results when the
physician could have warned the patient of the dangers prior to
treatment.

1970]
II.

MEDICAL MALPRA CTICE
PATIENT-PHYSICIAN

COMMUNICATION:

A

CORNERSTONE OF

EFFECTIVE MEDICAL CARE

A.

Protectingthe Patient'sRight of Free Choice

The right of a person to protect or disregard his own health is
inherent in the basic rights of bodily freedom and individual choice.
Although the health of the individual citizen is one of society's greatest
concerns, it is generally recognized that a competent adult cannot be
compelled by the state to submit to medical treatment against his will.'
Furthermore, since the mere appearance of private coercion in the form
of professional solicitation or advertisement is prohibited, 2 an
individual is forced to seek out a physician for medical treatment. Thus
it is well settled that the relationship between a physician and his
patient is a consensual one "wherein the patient knowingly seeks the
assistance of the physician and the physician knowingly accepts him as
a patient."' 3 A physician, therefore, cannot treat a patient unless he has
first obtained the patient's consent to act.4 This rule also protects the
patient's right to choose what should be done with his body, because
treatment without consent is characterized as a "harmful touching" of
the patient's body and, therefore, a battery. This result is not changed
even though the treatment may have been beneficial to the patient.5
1. See Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 1391 (1966). Upon application of a physician or hospital,
however, a few courts have ordered medical treatment for a non-consenting adult on the ground
that the state, as parenspatriae, has an interest in protecting the patient's life. This is especially
true if the patient has children who could become wards of the state upon his death or incapacity.
See, e.g., Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000,
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
2. E.g., State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Bohl, 162 Kan. 156, 174 P.2d 998 (1946)
(statutory provisions and administrative regulations were applied to revoke a doctor's license to
practice because he advertised in a local newspaper of general circulation); Barron v. Board of
Dental Examiners, 44 Cal. App. 2d 790, 113 P.2d 247 (1941) (a dentist's license was suspended
because he advertised in the yellow pages of a telephone directory); cf. B. SHARTEL & M. PLANT,
THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRAcrIcE § 5-17(2)(c) (1959).
3. Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 347, 294 N.W. 183, 187 (1940).
4. Robinson v. Crotwell, 175 Ala. 194, 57 So. 23 (1911); Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa
914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905); Rolater v.
Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 P. 96 (1913).
5. In the widely quoted case of Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105
N.E. 92 (1914), the defendant physician placed the plaintiff under anesthesia. The plaintiff had
consented to this treatment for the purpose of an examination only. While the plaintiff was
unconscious, the defendant removed an abdominal tumor. In holding that the operation was a
trespass, Judge Cardozo stated: "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." Id. at 12930, 105 N.E. at 93. Since the plaintiff consented only to an examination, the extension of the
treatment to a removal of the tumor was unauthorized and constituted a legal wrong. Liability
was imposed even though the surgery may have been beneficial to the plaintiff.
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The requirement of a valid consent as a condition precedent to
medical treatment can be met in several ways. First, the physician can
obtain the express consent of the patient either orally or in writing.,
Secondly, if there is no express affirmation, consent may be implied in
fact from the actions of the patient who knowingly accepts the
treatment recommended by his physician. 7 Lastly, consent may be
implied itt law when the patient, by his age or condition, is unable to
evidence his acceptance.8 Thus, if delay in treatment would threaten the
life or health of the patient in an emergency situation, the patient's
consent is implied as a matter of law on the theory that the patient
would not have withheld his consent if he had been given a choice.
Conversely, the law will impliedly designate the physician to be the
representative pro hoc vice of his patient and will charge him with the
responsibility of acting in the patient's interest.?
Despite the simple nature of these rules, the conclusion should be
avoided that the establishment of a valid consent is merely mechanical.
That a patient cannot give a valid consent to treatment about which
he knows nothing seems to be a logical proposition. The right of a
patient to decide what to do with his body necessarily implies the right
to comprehend the information necessary to make an intelligent choice.
This reasoning is followed by those courts which recognize that a
physician may be liable for failing to disclose medical information to
his patient.' 0 The case of Natanson v. Kline" serves as a good example.
Mrs. Natanson had undergone an operation for the removal of a
cancerous lesion in her left breast. Following the operation, Dr. Kline
advised, as a precautionary measure, that Mrs. Natanson undergo
radiation therapy to prevent the further spead of cancer. Mrs.
Natanson consented, but during the course of the treatment, she
suffered severe radiation burns. Dr. Kline had failed to inform Mrs.
Natanson bf the risk of such burns. The court held that Mrs. Natanson
was entitled to a reasonable disclosure by Dr. Kline, enabling her to
make an intelligent decision whether to take the cobalt treatment and
6. E.g., Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P.2d 520 (1953); Samuelson v. Taylor, 160
Wash. 369, 295 P. 113 (1931).
7. E.g., McGuire v. Rix, 118 Neb. 434, 225 N.W. 120 (1929).
8. E.g., Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912).
9. E.g., Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83 N.J.L. 20,83 A. 948 (Sup. Ct. 1912).
10. Naturally, the advisability of a particular course of treatment, from a medical

standpoint, is solely within the bounds of the physician's traditional role. The physician, rather
than the patient, has the technical knowledge to know what should be done. The patient, however,

has the right to say what will be done, since the patient is directly affected by the physician's
efforts.
1 I.

186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, modified, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
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hazard the risk that the cancerous condition had not spread beyond the
lesion. The court indicated that even though a doctor believes a
particular form of treatment is necessary, he cannot substitute his own

2
judgment for that of his patient.

B.

Promotingthe Patient's Confidence and Trust in his Physician

As in the association between an attorney and his client, the
physician and his patient enjoy a fiduciary relationship. 3 The physician
is expected to place the interests of his patient above his own and
should not engage in "puffing," which is customary and acceptable
with the typical vendor. As Professor Curran has pointed out, 4 the

professional ethic demands that the physician deal frankly and honestly
with his patient. "Hard sell" pitches that are inconsistent with the

.professional relationship may be dangerous, since the patient may
attribute the unexpected result to negligence by his physician. 5

Although the physician is expected to respect the interests of his
patient, Curran has maintained that most physicians favor the
withholding of frightening information from the patient; this practice

is called "overselling."' 5 From the physician's standpoint, overselling
is consistent with his traditional role as a fiduciary because it protects

the unduly apprehensive patient's chance of recovery by minimizing the
possibility of psychosomatic complications. Furthermore, since the

physician cannot anticipate a patient's reaction to the disclosure of
certain facts, the doctor is justified in taking a conservative approach
to the problem. The courts have not disregarded the needs of the unduly

apprehensive patient, but there has been little effort to deal with the
12. 186 Kan. at 407, 350 P.2d-at 1104: "A doctor might well believe that an operation or
form of treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not permit him to substitute his own
judgment for that of the patient by any form of artifice or deception."
13. See McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. Rav. 549
(1959).
14. Curran, Professional Negligence-Some General Comments, 12 VAND. L. REV. 535
(1959).
15. "There is a well settled ethical foundation here which imposes high demands on the
professional man to be frank and honest in his dealings with the client or patient. The client or
patient must be told what to expect in services. Good results should not be guaranteed unless this
is honestly what is expected. 'Hard sell' pitches are quite foreign to a professional relationship.
In the area of professional liability, 'hard sell' tactics can also be dangerous when the promised
result does not occur. A client or patient who is led to expect too much may well blame the bad
result on negligence by the practitioner." Id. at 542-43.
16. "The physician is in the greatest dilemma here. He cannot oversell, but he can't afford
to be so honest about the treatment that he raises unnecessary fears and anxieties in the patient.
It is often a difficult balance to maintain. Most physicians lean in favor of overselling to avoid
disturbing the patient." Id. at 543.
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issue from a fiduciary standpoint. It is generally accepted, however,
that excessive disclosure may amount to bad medical practice' 7

Although excessive disclosure may be harmful to certain patients,
the argument in support of overselling has lost force because the need

for promoting public confidence and trust in the medical profession has
been overlooked. Many physicians believe that their professional status
and technical competence should presumptively command a patient's

confidence. This attitude is reflected in the physician's second objection
to disclosure; namely, the more sensitive patient will act unreasonably

by refusing needed medical treatment for fear of its technical nature
or minimal risks. 18 A physician who takes the conservative approach
to the problem of disclosure may feel his action is justified because of
his superior knowledge. A recent California study has revealed,
however, that it is the physician with this attitude who is sued most
often for malpractice. On the other hand, the great majority of
physicians probably do not have this attitude and will approach the

problem of disclosure on a case to case basis with a view to stimulating
patient trust and confidence.
C. Recovery for Failingto Disclose

The origin of the cause of action based upon the physician's failure
to make an adequate disclosure to his patient 20 has been traced by one
author21 to an article by Professor Allan H. McCoid in 1957.22 After
a comprehensive survey of the pertinent cases involving unauthorized
medical treatment, McCoid observed as follows:
One particular obligation which the law may properly exact or impose, however,
is the obligation of a doctor to make a reasonable disclosure to the patient of the
nature of his illness or infirmity; the nature of the treatment proposed and the
17. E.g., Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963).
18. On the other hand, the right of a patient to refuse treatment, regardless of the motive,
is the very right protected by the duty to disclose.
19. See Silverman, Medicine's Legal Nightmare: The Source of the Trouble, THE
SATURDAY EVENING PosT, April 25, 1959, at 36.
20. The earliest case concerning the problem of inadequate disclosure was decided by a
Canadian court, in Kenny v. Lockwood, [1932] 1 D.L.R. 507 (1931). The court held that the duty
of the physician was to deal honestly with the patient about the necessity, character, and
importance of an operation. Although this duty included probable consequences and chances for
success, it did not extend to discussions of the dangers inherent in any operation or to details
which might frighten the patient. American courts have adopted a more demanding rule. See notes
24-26 infra and accompanying text.
21. See Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 640-48
(1968).
22. McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN.
L. REV. 381 (1957).
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danger of using such treatment or alternative treatment, and then permit the
patient to decide whether to submit to the treatment or not.2

In the same year, the case of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University
Board of Trustees24 held a physician liable for failure to disclose. The
Salgo court, which upheld a jury instruction, 2 concluded that a

physician could not induce a patient's consent by minimizing known
dangers of a procedure. The physician violated his duty when he
withheld any facts necessary to an "intelligent consent." At the same
time, however, the physician was obligated to consider the welfare of
his patient above all else. The court recognized that under these

guidelines, the physician was placed in an awkward position when
dealing with the unduly apprehensive patient. On the other hand, the

physician was allowed "a certain amount of discretion," as long as its
exercise was "consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to

an informed consent. ' 26 As a case of first impression, Salgo left many
questions unanswered but clearly expanded tort liability for the
physician. The number of cases that have followed Salgo graphically

demonstrates the complexity and seriousness of the problem of
disclosure.
23. Id. at 434. Professor McCoid had previously concluded that: "The trial and decision
of these unauthorized operation cases would be greatly improved in terms of consistency of theory
and appropriateness of liability if there were a single basis for liability in all malpractice cases,
other than the occasional instance of an actual assault and battery in the sense of an intentional
deviation from practice which does not tend to be beneficial to the patient. The basis of liability
should be deviation from the standard of conduct of a reasonable and prudent doctor of the same
school of practice as the defendant under similar circumstances. The author believes that under
such a standard the patient will be properly protected by the medical profession's own recognition
of its obligation to maintain its standards." Id.
24. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957) (plaintiff paralized as a result of an
aortography).
25. Id. at 578, 317 P.2d at 181. "A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects
himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent
consent by the patient to the proposed treatment. Likewise the physician may not minimize the
known dangers of a procedure or operation in order to induce his patient's consent. At the same
time, the physician must place the welfare of his patient above all else and this very fact places
him in a position in which he sometimes must choose between two alternative courses of action.
One is to explain to the patient any risk attendant upon any surgical procedure or operation, no
matter how remote; this may well result in alarming a patient who is already unduly apprehensive
and who may as a result refuse to undertake surgery in which there is in fact minimal risk; it
may also result in actually increasing the risks by reason of the physiological results of the
apprehension itself. The other is to recognize that each patient presents a separate problem, that
the patient's mental and emotional condition is important and in certain cases may be crucial,
and that in discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must be employed
consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent." Id.
26.

Id.
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CONFUSION OVER THE THEORY OF RECOVERY

A.

Battery and Negligence Distinguished

The courts have confused the theory of recovery which a plaintiff
must adopt when he sues his physician for failing to disclose medical
information. The terms "intelligent consent" and "informed consent,"
as used by the Salgo court, have taken root in American law. The use
of such simple terms, however, has produced a legal myopia. On one
hand, courts are confronted with the rule that any treatment
administered without the consent of the patient is unauthorized and,
therefore, a battery. On the other hand, the ordinary rules of medical
malpractice which impose upon the physician a professional standard
of care seem applicable to the problem of disclosure.2?
In order to understand the difference between battery and
negligence as a basis for recovery, the character of the particular
information withheld must first be analyzed. It is well recognized that
there can be no battery when the patient has given a valid consent to
the proposed treatment.2 Consequently, if the physician, by his silence
or misrepresentation, causes the patient to be mistaken as to the
essential character or nature of the Medical procedure, the patient's
consent to the treatment is not valid and the physician will be liable
for battery. If the misrepresentation goes only to some collateral
matter which merely operates to induce the patient's consent, the
consent is valid and there is no battery. In this instance, the patient
may have a cause of action against the physician for negligence. The
clearest example of this distinction can be demonstrated by the
following example. A physician represents to an unsuspecting female
patient that intercourse is necessary medical treatment when he clearly
intends the contact for his own benefit. Her consent to the treatment
is invalid, and the physician is liable for battery.The theory supporting
recovery is that the patient was unaware of the nature of the contact;
namely, that which made it harmful or offensive. Conversely, if the
physician made advances to the patient and secured her consent after
giving her a sum of counterfeit money, the consent is valid even though
she would not have consented had she known that the money was
worthless. In this case, the misrepresentation went only to a collateral
fact which concerned the touching and induced the patient's consent.
27. It has been suggested that this confusion was created by the modern pleading rules
which do not require the plaintiff to analyze his theory of recovery prior to the trial of the case,
See Plante, supra note 21, at 639.40 &n.4.
28. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
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The patient understood the offensive nature of the touching and cannot
sue the physician for battery. 9 Generally, a physician who fails to
disclose collateral risks to a proposed operation or procedure should
not be held liable for battery since the resulting harm was not
intentional. The proper cause of action would be negligence.
B. Informed Consent as Battery
In the case of Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital," the plaintiff
brought an action for assault or unauthorized operation. Suffering
from a urinary problem, the plaintiff consulted with the defendant, who
diagnosed the condition as an enlargement of the prostate gland. The
defendant obtained the consent of the plaintiff to perform a
transurethral prostatic resection; subsequently, this operation was
performed. The defendant, however, did not inform the plaintiff that
the operation required, as a matter of routine, the cutting of the
spermatic cords. The plaintiff was rendered sterile by the operation.
The court treated the case correctly as sounding in battery and
held that whether the plaintiff consented to the severance of his
spermatic cords was a question of fact for the jury. The opinion did
not refer to the concept of informed consent, but the Salgo case had
not yet attracted nationwide attention. Even so, the facts are similar
to many subsequent informed consent cases because the defendant had
pre-operative knowledge of medical information which should have
been disclosed to the plaintiff. The defendant committed a battery since
his silence misled the plaintiff as to the essential nature of the
operation. This is not a case of inducement to consent by nondisclosure of a collateral fact; rather, the cutting of the spermatic cords
was a necessary part of the operation.3 1 The failure to disclose this fact
rendered the plaintiff's consent ineffective and subjected the defendant
to liability for battery.
Most cases, however, are not so easily classified. In Govin v.
Hunter'32 the defendant performed a surgical operation upon the right
leg of Mrs. Govin for the correction of a varicose vein condition. Mrs.
Govin testified that she had been told by the defendant that he would
strip the offending vein with one incision behind the knee and one
29. For an excellent discussion of this distinction and the significance to the theory of
recovery, see Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 55, 57 and illustrations (1965); Plante, supra note 21, at 648-50.
30. 251 Minn. 427,88 N.W.2d 186 (1958).
31. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 18, at 107 (3d ed. 1964).
32. 374 P.2d 421 (Wyo. 1962).
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behind the ankle. The vein in question was entirely removed, but the
severity of the varicosity necessitated six incisions rather than two. The
physicians who testified on the subject claimed that it was impossible
to strip this vein with two incisions and that surgeons cannot estimate
the number of necessary incisions. The court concluded that "under
certain circumstances a physician has a duty to reveal any serious risks
which are involved in a contemplated operation."33 Disblosure is
required in order to assure that the patient's informed consent is
obtained.
It might be argued that the number of incisions required in an
operation of the type performed on Mrs. Govin is a collateral fact.
Therefore, the defendant's failure to disclose did not mislead the
plaintiff, who consented to an operation which was described to her.
The non-disclosed fact, however, went to the nature of the operation
rather than to a collateral risk. An incision is a necessary part of an
operation. If a physician is uncertain as to the number of incisions
which will be required, this does not, however, introduce an element of
risk. A similar problem arises in connection with any exploratory type
operation: the physician is unable to define the scope of the treatment
before it is actually begun. The Govin court, therefore, was incorrect
since the nature of the operation was not clearly described to the
plaintiff prior to surgery. Consequently, the appropriate cause of action
was battery and not negligence.
In 1965, a Texas state court was faced with the issue of informed
consent in the case of Scott v. Wilson.34 The plaintiff filed an action
for malpractice against his physician who had performed an ear
operation which rendered the plaintiff completely deaf in the left ear.
The defendant had informed the plaintiff that there was a ten percent
chance of an unexpected result but did not mention that one percent
of such operations resulted in a total loss of hearing. 35 The court
reasoned that the question for decision was as follows:
[W]hether Dr. Wilson reasonably and adequately informed Scott of the dangers
and hazards to be anticipated from the stapedectomy operation so as to prepare

him to give a knowledgeable consent to the operation. 6

In reversing a directed verdict for the defendant at the close of the
plaintiff's evidence, the court held that:
The consent which Scott gave to have the operation performed is of no effect
33. Id. at 423. The court decided in favor of the defendant on other grounds.
34. 396 S.W.2d 532 (rex. Civ. App. 1965), rev'don rehearing,412 S.W.2d 299 (rex. 1967).
35. There was also evidence that the defendant represented that he was experienced in
performing such operations. The operation, however, was the defendant's first.
36. Scott v. Wilson, 396 S.W.2d 532, 533 (rex. Civ. App. 1965).
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unless it was an informed and knowledgeable consent. . . . If Dr. Wilson did not
have Scott's informed consent to operate upon him he would be guilty3 7of assault
and battery on Scott, and liable for the damages caused by the operation.

Contrary to the position taken in Govin, the Scott court concluded that
an operation without the informed consent of the patient rendered the
physician liable for battery.38
The previous analysis of the scope of the battery theory in the area
of disclosure demonstrates that the Scott case was incorrect in relying
upon battery as the controlling theory of recovery. Assuming that the
defendant failed to disclose the risk of total loss of hearing, this failure
merely induced the plaintiff to consent to an operation which he
otherwise understood. The plaintiff was not mistaken about the
essential nature of the operation since the defendant reviewed and
explained the nature of the operation to the plaintiff.39
The Arizona Supreme Court stated the following rule in an
attempt to define the scope of recovery under a battery theory:
[C]onsent . . . is effectual if the consentor understands substantially the nature
of the surgical procedure attempted and the probable results of the operation.
This, as a matter of law, constitutes an informed consent. Lacking this, the
operation is a battery unless some special exception pertains. Given an informed
consent, liability, if any, must be predicated in malpractice."

This rule is well constructed for it recognizes that to obtain a valid
consent the physician must inform the patient what steps are necessary
to effect a cure and what positive results are likely to flow from the
treatment. A failure to disclose the risks incident to the course of
treatment, or any other collateral fact, will not constitute a battery;
however, such conduct may be negligent.
The foregoing discussion emphasizes that an attorney should
carefully analyze the facts of a case involving inadequate disclosure.
While the courts are ambiguous as to the scope of a battery action in
this area, the trend is clearly in the direction of treating all types of
wrongful nondisclosure as negligence. One writer has suggested that the
battery theory should be retained only if the physician operates on an
37. Id. at 535.
38. Despite the conclusion, the court cited 4 cases which suggested a negligence approach:
Russell v. Harwick, 166 So. 2d 904 (Fla. App. 1964); Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So. 2d 888 (Fla.
App. 1963); Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d I1 (Mo. 1960), disapproved in part, Aiken v.
Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965); DiRosse v. Wein, 24 App. Div. 2d 510, 261 N.Y.S.2d 623
(1965).
39. On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court held that the proper action was malpractice for
a physician's failure to conform to medical standards in obtaining the patient's consent. The court
retreated from its position somewhat by saying that this action "need not be pleaded as one for
assault and battery." Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. 1967).
40. Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 370,409 P.2d 74, 86 (1965).
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incorrect area of the body or viciously acts out of anger." While the
scope of the action is not restricted to these circumstances, "a
physician should be liable like anyone else for an assault of a nature
not peculiar to the. physician-patient relationship, [and] few would deny
the appropriateness of invoking assault and battery principles where the
physician deliberately substitutes his own will for that of the patient by
carrying on a procedure over the patient's protests, or intentionally
indulges in other flagrant misconduct toward the patient."4 The scope
of the battery action is much broader because of the historical
significance of the inviolability of the body in Anglo-American
society.43
Some courts have questioned the propriety of applying a battery
theory when the physician acts without fully informing the patient
about the contemplated procedure or operation. The reasoning is thai
traditional battery involves a defendant who is generally acting out of
malice or in a manner considered to be antisocial.44 Prosser has
suggested, however, that "the gist of the action for battery is not the
hostile intent of the defendant, but rather the absence of consent on the
part of the plaintiff."45 The interest to be protected by an action for
battery is the patient's right to know that which makes the
recommended medical procedure harmful or offensive before he gives
his consent. If the physician fails to reveal this information, he should
be liable for battery since he has violated a right of his patient.
C. Informed Consent as Negligence

If there has been a failure to disclose a risk and an unexpected
injury occurs, the courts have generally treated the problem as one of
negligence or malpractice.46 As with the battery approach, the question
is whether the physician has obtained the informed consent of the
patient. For example, in reversing Scott v. Wilson,47 the Supreme Court
of Texas concluded: "Physicians and surgeons have a duty to make a
reasonable disclosure to a patient of risks that are incident to medical
diagnosis and treatment. 4 8 This court indicated that the duty to
41.
(1967).

42.

Note, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 1369, 1399 n.18

1 D. LouISSELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 222 (1969).
43. Id. at 223.
44. Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 302 (rex. 1967).
45. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 35 (3d ed. 1964).
46. This result was suggested by the court in Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409
P.2d 74 (1965).
47. See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
48. Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d at 301.
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inform was based on the patient's right to information which insures
an intelligent decision whether to consent or refuse the treatment. In
characterizing the problem as one of negligence-imposing a duty to
use reasonable care in informing the patient-the courts are
approaching the adoption of a single basis of liability in all malpractice
cases. 9
Furthermore, courts have recognized that disclosure is a relative
matter involving a problem of medical judgment." The duty is not
absolute; only a reasonable disclosure is required. Many facts collateral
to medical procedure are trivial and, in some cases, would only serve
to disturb the patient. Also, the physician does not have the time to
disclose everything. For example, in deciding whether to disclose a
known risk, the physician should consider the state of the patient's
physicial and mental health. The physician should also take into
account, among other things, whether the risk is serious or likely to
occur.5 1 Thus the physician must consider a variety of information, not
unlike a diagnosis. It is arguable, by analogy, that his handling of this
information ought to be scrutinized in terms of negligence to determine
whether his disclosure has met the legal standard imposed upon those
in his profession.-2
The principles of negligence allow some leeway in the physician's
conduct, since nondisclosure, which might otherwise be negligent, is
permitted if it has a certain utility. 3 Nondisclosure, therefore, does not
amount to negligence if it serves to protect the patient from undue
apprehension. This is an application of the balancing test and describes
the approach which the physician must take concerning the problem of
disclosure.5 4 A physician gets into trouble, however, by failing to
recognize that each patient differs and that if there is no disclosure, he
may later be asked to justify his conduct. The mere belief that
49.
50.

This result has been advocated by Professor McCoid. See note 23 supra.
E.g., Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299

(Trex. 1967).
51.

Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965).

52. See I D. LoUISELL & H.

WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

223 (1969). "It is arguable

that for this kind of case, the standard of the negligence action-possession and use of due skill
and care-better accords with the realities of the physician-patient relationship. After all, the
process of procuring a patient's consent to a surgical or other medical procedure, is only a part
of the total physician-patient communication problem; and the physician's failure to communicate
with reasonable care respecting consent-e.g. failure to have the consent adequately formalized
or its limits precisely particularized-is closely akin to other failures thought at worst to be only
negligent." Id.
53. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 31, at 151-52 (3d ed. 1964).
54. The jury instruction reviewed in the Salgo case reflected the balancing approach. See
note 25 supra.
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nondisclosure was in the best interest of a particular patient may not
convince a jury. Although the jury will never be charged in terms of
the balancing test, they will consider any evidence which tends to
establish that nondisclosure was in the best interest of the patient.
The withholding of information from the unduly apprehensive
patient has been treated by some courts and writers as a matter of
privilege. 5 This approach is theoretically incorrect if the question is one
of negligence. A privilege is recognized in the area of intentional torts
as an affirmative defense to conduct which the defendant admits is
wrong. If the physician is justified in refusing to disclose frightening
information to the unduly apprehensive patient, his conduct does not
amount to a legal wrong; rather, the utility of his conduct outweighs
the harm that might result from nondisclosure. There can be no
privilege, however, to commit a negligent act.
The failure of a physician to make an adequate disclosure of
collateral facts should be measured in terms of negligence since
negligence is a matter of unreasonable conduct in the face of a
foreseeable risk. 6 Treatment without disclosure may be negligent if the
physician knowingly places an unsugpecting patient in a position
involving an unreasonable risk. It should be emphasized that in most
medical procedures the risk rarely materializes and the results are
usually beneficial to the patient. When a risk does develop into injury,
however, the physician's failure to inform the patient of that risk may
constitute a negligent failure to guard against that risk. Consequently,
a physician may be negligent in failing to disclose that a thyroidectomy
carries a risk of total paralysis of the vocal cords,5" that an operation
to remove cataracts may result in total loss of sight," or that radiation
therapy can cause severe external or internal burns. 9 These risks are
unavoidable in the sense that the physician can do little to avoid them
once the operation has begun. 0 The physician's negligence arises by not
55.

E.g., Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, modified, 187 Kan. 186, 354

P.2d 670 (1960) (dicta that there is a privilege, on therapeutic grounds, to withhold the specific
diagnosis when the disclosure would seriously jeopardize the recovery of an unstable,
temperamental, or severely depressed patient); 75 HARv. L. REv. 1445, 1448 (1962).
56. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 31, at 148 (3d ed. 1964).
57. DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961).
58. Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358,409 P.2d 74 (1965).
59. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, modified, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d
670 (1960).
60. The great majority of cases dealing with the duty to inform have involved injuries

suffered as a result of surgical operations. The problem of disclosure, however, is also present
when the physician intends to use drugs to treat his patient. The inevitable side effects produced
by many drugs pose serious threats of permanent injury to the patient.
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providing the patient with the opportunity to avoid risks through a
refusal of treatment.
The case of Aiken v. Clary/' serves as a good example. The
defendant physician advised that the plaintiff take insulin shock
therapy as treatment for mental illness. The major risk involved in such
treatment is that of "delayed awakening" produced by an overreaction
to the drug. This can result in brain injury if not reversed quickly. The
defendant did not disclose this risk to the plaintiff but did inform him
that the treatment was much like being put to sleep. The insulin
administered to the plaintiff caused him to lapse into deep coma; before
the plaintiff could be revived, he suffered organic brain damage.
In reversing a jury verdict for the defendant and awarding the
plaintiff a new trial, the A iken court held that the facts presented a
question of negligent conduct on the part of the physician in failing to
disclose the risk of brain injury. 2 The jury may have inferred that the
defendant was negligent in subjecting the plaintiff to an unreasonable
risk of brain damage by creating a false sense of security which induced
consent to the treatment.
D.

Consequences of the Choice of Theory

Several considerations are involved in the choice between the two
theories of recovery: battery and negligence. 3 On one hand, battery is
based on the lack of a valid consent to a touching; therefore, the main
question for the jury is whether the plaintiff gave a valid consent. The
term valid consent, when used in a battery action based on a failure
to disclose, implies that the plaintiff voluntarily accepted medical
treatment after a reasonable disclosure of its essential nature. The
physician's duty is to disclose the nature of the touching before the
patient consents.
On the other hand, an action for negligence is possible even though
61. 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
62. "The basic philosophy in malpractice cases is that the doctor is negligent by reason of
the fact that he has failed to adhere to a standard of reasonable medical care, and that
consequently the service rendered was substandard and negligent. In our judgment, this is true
whether the alleged malpractice consists of improper care and treatment (the usual malpractice
case) or whether it is based, as here, on an alleged failure to inform the patient sufficiently to
enable him to make a judgment and give an informed consent if he concludes to accept the
recommended treatment." Id. at 673.
63. In some states, for example, battery and negligence are mutually exclusive and cannot
be pleaded in the same cause of action. Besides the difficulty in drafting the pleadings, a choice
between battery and negligence will involve, among other things, the consideration of expert
testimony requirements, statutes of limitation restrictions, and insurance coverage. See Note,
Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 1396, 1399-1400 n.18 (1967).
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the patient has given a valid consent. Therefore, the plaintiff must
establish and the jury must find the traditional elements of a negligence
action. The jury's attention is focused only upon the physician's failure
to disclose collateral facts pertaining to a proposed procedure or
operation. It is in this area that the duty to inform becomes an
independent legal concept, since a physician should not, by his silence
or misrepresentation, subject a patient to unreasonable risk of bodily
harm.

IV.

ESTABLISHING A STANDARD OF DISCLOSURE

A.

The Reasonable Medical Practitioner

The overwhelming majority rule is that a physician must disclose
what a reasonable medical practitioner of the same school and same
or similar community would have disclosed to his patient concerning
a given treatment. 4 Therefore, the plaintiff's case will not reach the
jury unless he introduces expert testimony establishing that it was
customary in his community or in a similar community to disclose the
risk of his injury. This rule would seem to prevail even when there is a
total absence of disclosure since the burden is on the plaintiff to
establish the custom. One court indicated, however, that when there is
no disclosure, the plaintiff is relieved from establishing the standard of
care by the use of expert witnesses. The underlying reasoning is that
regardless of the standard of disclosure, something must be said by the
physician. 5 In any event, disclosure is not necessary in an emergency,
since the patient is not in a position to choose whether to accept or
reject treatment.66
In adopting the locality rule as part of the standard of care, courts
have been subjected to much criticism. The requirement is patently
unfair to the injured plaintiff, for it is doubtful that a custom of
disclosure actually exists in a community of physicians. One author has
argued that if a custom does exist, it would be too general to be of
practical value.67 Since the use of medical experts to establish a custom
64.

DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan.

6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963); Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1963); Hunt v.
Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (rex. "1967);
Anderson v. Hooker, 420 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Cir. App. 1967); Govin v. Hunter, 374 P.2d 421
(Wyo. 1962). For a full treatment of the locality rule, see Note, An Evaluation of Changes in
the Medical Standardof Care, 23 VAND. L. REV. 729 (1970).
65. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, modified, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d
670 (1960).
66. E.g., Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221,377 P.2d 520 (1962).
67. 75 HARV. L. REV. 1445, 1447 (1962).
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has been criticized in the ordinary malpractice suit,6s it would seem
even more unfair to ask a physician to judge the adequacy of another
physician's disclosure without an established professional standard.
Furthermore, from a practical standpoint, the physicians of a
community may set a low standard of disclosure without fear that the
level of professional treatment will be affected. 9 More importantly,
however, the locality rule is not needed to protect the physician. The
rule was adopted to protect the isolated physician from a higher
standard of care imposed upon physicians outside his community. 0 On
the other hand, the ability to make an adequate disclosure is not based
on the possession and use of modern skills, but rather on common
sense, provided the physician is aware of the risks associated with a
procedure. Even if the physician was unaware of a risk which
culminated in an injury, many textwriters would oppose the application
of a community standard to determine whether he should have known
71
of that risk.
A minority of courts do not allow the physician to interpose a
defense that his conduct met with the custom of his community. These
courts have adopted the rule that the plaintiff is only required to show
what disclosure a reasonable medical practitioner would have made
under the same or similar circumstances. 72 As with the majority rule,
however, expert testimony is required to establish the standard of
disclosure. Both the majority and minority rules have been criticized
on the ground that disclosure must depend upon the particular facts
of each case.7"
B.

Disclosureas a Specific Duty

It has been suggested that the adoption of a specific rule as to the
standard of disclosure would serve to protect the interest of the
68. Curran, Professional Negligence-Some General Comments, 12 VAND. L. REV. 535,
538-40 (1959).
69. It is doubtful, however, that the physicians of a particular community will deliberately
attempt to set a low standard of disclosure so as to protect themselves from liability. Nevertheless,
the same result may occur in a community of physicians where the so-called "conspiracy of
silence" is a particular problem.
70. See generally McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV.
549, 569-75 (1959); Note, Standard of Care for Medical Practitioners-TheLocality Rule, 14
S.D.L. REv. 349 (1969).
71. See generally Comment, Expert Testimony in Medical MalpracticeCases, 17 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 182, 189-95 (1962); Comment, Medical Malpractice-Expert Testimony, 60 Nw. U.L.
REv. 834, 837-39 (1966); 46 N.C.L. REv. 680 (1968).
72. E.g., Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
73. Note, supra note 63; 75 HARV. L. REV. 1445 (1962).
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patient. 74 Indeed, when dealing with professional negligence, there is a
judicial trend away from general to specific professional duties. This
reflects a growing public understanding of medical practice. Some
courts have adopted a standard of absolute 75 or full disclosure 7 of
risks, even though these standards are suspect because of the radical
treatment involved77 and the allowance of discretion
on the part of the
1
physician. There is authority that serious risks should be disclosed
78
under certain circumstances.
One solution to the problem has been suggested:
A physician i under an obligation (1) to make a full disclosure of all known
material risks in a proposed operation or course of treatment except for those risks
of which the patient is likely to know or (2) to prove the reasonableness of any
lesser disclosure or the immateriality of the undisclosed risk."

Apparently, the physician must disclose only material risks, which are
determined by the incidence and the severity of possible injury. The
plaintiff would have to call upon expert testimony to establish both
elements. Under the majority rule of disclosure, at least one court has
held that the plaintiff need not give expert testimony on the incidence
of the risk in order to avoid a directed verdict."0 Nevertheless, the rule
does limit the disclosure required of a physician; however, the
maximum disclosure is still indefinite because the materiality of a risk
is always influenced by the physicial condition of the individual patient.
Whether a particular risk is material is a question of fact for the jury.
This rule would also protect the physician who establishes
reasonable grounds for the nondisclosure. The burden would be on the
defendant to prove that nondisclosure was in the best interest of the
plaintiff. The defendant should be allowed to show that if he had
disclosed the risks, the plaintiff would not have been able to make an
intelligent choice; that is, to understand the effect of a decision to
forego treatment. This is analogous to the treatment of an incompetent
or a child. If the defendant attempts to raise this as a justification for
nondisclosure, his credibility may be impeached by showing that he
failed to talk with an available third party, such as the patient's wife
or relative. Furthermore, a complete defense to nondisclosure would be
that the plaintiff knew or should have known of the risk.
74. Note, supra note 63.
75. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d
170 (1957).
76. Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
77. Note, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice,55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396, 1401 (1967).
78. See text accompanying notes 32 &33 supra.
79. Note, supra note 77, at 1407.
80. Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
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The proposition that there is a specific duty to disclose does not
seem sufficiently broad to justify the conclusion reached by the court
in Stewart v. Long Island College Hospital.8 ' Before this decision, the
New York courts had held that a physician was obligated to make a
reasonable disclosure to his patient of the known dangers which were
incident to or possible in the proposed treatment."2 In the Stewart case,
the plaintiff, who had contracted german measles during the first
trimester of pregnancy, was informed that there was a chance that her
child would be born with birth defects. Upon the advice of the four
consulting physicians, no abortion was performed. The plaintiffs child
was born with serious defects. The plaintiff later learned that two of
the four physicians disagreed with the decision not to abort. The court
held that the plaintiff was entitled to know that the two physicians did
not agree with the course of treatment recommended since that
knowledge might have impelled her to seek another opinion.
The Stewart holding was clearly an extension of the earlier rule
which required a reasonable disclosure of known dangers or risks. A
reasonable disclosure in New York now contemplates some discussion
of the alternatives open to the patient, as well as the known dangers.
This extension of the earlier rule is logical because a patient's consent
may be induced by his lack of knowledge of the possible alternatives.
This is true even though the patient fully understands the risks inherent
in the treatment recommended by his physician.
That a patient can be misled by the physician's failure to discuss
alternatives is presented clearly in the factual situation of Custodio v.
Bauer.8 The plaintiff was the mother of nine children. The defendant
undertook to accomplish a sterilization at the plaintiff's request in
order to prevent further conception and to aid in the treatment of
troublesome kidney and bladder conditions. Although the defendant
removed a portion of the plaintiff's fallopian tubes, the plaintiff later
became pregnant. The defendant had failed to inform the plaintiff that
since there was a possibility that the severed tubes could grow together,
the plaintiff could again become pregnant. He also failed to advise the
plaintiff that there were several surgical procedures available which
would accomplish a complete sterilization. On the basis of these facts,
the court held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action against
81. 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
82. DiRosse v. Wein, 24 App. Div. 510, 261 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (use of gold
compound in treatment of rheumatoid arthritis led to exfoliative dermatitis).
83. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
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the physician for failing to use due care with respect to duties owed to
the plaintiff.84
Assuming that the risk of conception in Custodio was not
material, it was rendered material by the availability of an alternative
procedure which, if followed, would have completely removed the risk
of pregnancy. Therefore, a jury should be instructed that the
materiality of a risk is affected, not only by its incidence and severity,
but also by the presence or absence of a reasonable alternative, which,
if employed by the physician, would remove the risk itself while
accomplishing the same result sought by the defendant. Under the
majority rule, which requires a reasonable disclosure, the jury should
be instructed to consider the total circumstances of the case in
determining whether a given risk is material. Perhaps it would be to
the plaintiff's advantage if the jury were instructed that a physician is
under a specific duty to disclose all material collateral facts incident
to a proposed operation or course of treatment. This would enable the
jury to consider the failure to disclose reasonable alternatives as only
one of the circumstances affecting the physician's liability rather than
as affecting the materiality of the risk.
V.

PROXIMATE CAUSE

The proof of a legal relationship between the defendant's failure
to inform the patient and the patient's injuries is an uncertain burden
that the injured plaintiff bears. The theory of this element in the
plaintiff's cause of action is that had the physician revealed the risk of
injury or other appropriate collateral facts, the plaintiff would not have
consented to the operation or course of treatment. Therefore, the injury
would not have occurred. As stated earlier, the establishment of cause
in fact does not depend upon a finding that the doctor was negligent
in conducting the operation or in administering the treatment. The
technical competency of the physician is not questioned by the plaintiff,
although several courts have incorrectly pointed to the lack of any
specific negligence.in affirming a directed verdict for the physician in
85
actions dealing with informed consent.
The difficulty arises when the plaintiff cannot present any direct
proof that his consent would have been withheld. Likewise, if the
defendant cannot directly prove the contrary, his only assertion is that
he believed that the plaintiff, from all of the objective manifestations
of consent, was willing to undergo the operation or treatment.
84. The court also indicated that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for battery,
presumably because the defendant had misled her as to the nature of the operation.
85. E.g., Gravis v. Physicians & Surgeons Hosp., 415 S.W. 2d 674 (rex. Civ. App. 1967).
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Of course, the jury's function is to reach a decision with or
without the aid of direct proof. In the professional malpractice case,
the issues presented largely involve a question of credibility of the
witnesses and parties. For example, in most informed. consent cases, the
physician testifies that he did disclose the risk of injury while the
plaintiff takes a contrary position. Thus the jury may decide the
question of breach of duty solely on the credibility of the parties. This
determination differs from a finding of proximate cause. In
determining proximate cause, the jury considers the plaintiff's state of
mind. The defendant is helpless on this point 'because he cannot know
whether the plaintiff would have refused treatment had the plaintiff
been told of the risk. In light of this, the question arises whether the
jury should be instructed to determine whether a reasonable person
would have refused treatment under the same circumstances. Such an
instruction would seem to abrogate the plaintiff's right to make his
own decision though it may be patently illogical or unreasonable. Such
an instruction, however, would aid the administration of justice and
serve to protect the physician. The law should serve to protect the
patient's right of free choice, but it cannot protect his right to make
an unreasonable choice on an after-the-fact basis. The law can only
presume that the patient would have acted reasonably, and the
physician should be protected to this extent.
Despite the difficulty of proof, the plaintiff should be required to
present some evidence on the question of proximate cause. This would
aid the jury in differentiating between the issues of breach of duty and
proximate cause, both involving the credibility of the parties. At least
one court has allowed the jury to infer negligence in the absence of any
testimony by the plaintiff, that he would not have consented.8 6 This
court indicated that such a requirement would make recovery
impossible in the case of a patient who had died or was unable to
testify. Such a requirement, however, could be made conditional upon
the availability of the patient. If the patient is available, the defendant
should be allowed the right of cross-examination in order to impeach
the plaintiff's assertion that his consent would have been withheld if the
proper disclosure had been made.
Once proximate cause is established, the plaintiff may recover for
those unexpected injuries which arise as a matter of probability from
the operation or course of treatment. The defendant is liable for the
bad results of the medical treatment although he used his best efforts
86.

Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
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to prevent the harm from occuring. The imposition of liability for
conduct of this nature may at first seem harsh. Professor Curran has
observed:
To the professionals themselves probably the single most disturbing fear is that
the law will call them to answer in damages merely because the result they
obtained was bad. Lawyers perhaps too often shrug off this complaint. It is a real
fear, however, and has some truth in it both as regards filing of claims and even
successful litigation by plaintiffs.87

On the other hand, the law does not impose liability for the physician's
failure to inform his patient merely because the physician's efforts
produced a bad result. The bad result, which is not in itself proof of
negligence, must be combined with a failure to disclose material
information.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It has long been recognized in American law that a proper patientphysician relationship is founded upon the technical competency of the
physician. Before the advent of cases dealing with informed consent, a
patient who had given his consent to proposed treatment could recover
for injuries only when the physician had acted incompetently in the
administration of the treatment. Within the past fifteen years, however,
the courts have recognized that the maintenance of a proper patientphysician relationship depends not only upon the technical competency
of the physician, but also upon the presence of effective communication
between the two parties. Therefore, recent cases have held physicians
liable on a theory of negligence, even though the patient has given a
valid consent and the physician has demonstrated a technical
competency, when it was established that the communication respecting
the proposed treatment was inadequate. This increased emphasis upon
effective communication will undoubtably lead to a greater public
confidence in the medical profession.
STEPHEN L. EDWARDS
87. Curran, Professional Negligence-Some General Comments, 12 VAND. L. REV. 535,
541 (1959). The physician's basic complaint is that he is being held to a standard of strict liability.
He would maintain that where he has selected a form of treatment which is medically sound and
has administered this treatment in a manner acceptable within his profession, he should not be
held liable if injury results. The physician's liability for failing to inform his patient, however,
does not rest on a theory of strict liability. A physician is strictly liable in this sense when he
treats the patient without first disclosing what risks will be incurred. A physician must be
prepared to compensate his patient if the unexpected injury materializes, even though he took
every precaution to avoid it. His liability, however, is not strict because it rests upon an
independent wrong; namely, a failure to inform his patient adequately in order that the patient
may intelligently decide to accept the risk of injury.

